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On Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon
1983.

Striking what good books came out in 1983: Peddlers of Crisis, With Enough shovels, Wizards. The year we almost lost it, because of the persistence of the beliefs and programs on both sides recounted in these books, and underlying the work I participated in in 1958-63.

351: Nixon rationale for ABM, guarding MM: supposedly threatened by SS-9s (25 MT warhead, but with a three-warhead version possibly MIRV; NIE said MRV, which meant MMs weren't threatened, but Laird and HAK pressed estimate to be changed to MIRV.

Even so, spurious argument about "temptation to preempt" against MM, despite the existence of SLBMs (and B-52s). Actually, not entirely spurious, as 1983 showed, though premature: and of course, ignores phasing out MM! (In this case, MMs are used to justify ABM, rather than SU ABM being used to justify MIRV...)

In April 1969, AJW was still promoting calculations of SAC vulnerability as critical.

Zuckerman's "realities of air warfare" had led in WWII to the brute force of Harris, Le May, Power. And nothing more has ever been embodied in operational planning.

[Big koan, of AJW and AWM: If GW does "occur," what do you do with your warheads? Aim them only at cities? Though MAD suggested that, to public, it never had any relation to actual targeting: over 80% of that was always against "military" targets (though "military" included C3, in cities, and other targets in cities). Target "also" at cities? Why? (Not that it would make a lot of difference: contrary to my guidance).

[Does Sanders give enough, or any, attention either to service pressure, or MIC, or FU imperial interests?]

357 R in RAND might stand for "Rationalizing." (Air-force Arms for Doomsday)

358, (Pretty absurd to think that a large CF attack against SU—or US!—wouldn't be responded to with attacks on cities.

Schles at RAND in 1968 gives up on FS/CF, but turns to TCS, limited or graduated reprisals, LSR: as silly as LNW (HAK). Dec. 1968. Rationale for new manned bomber! (Like CF, for WWK) Northern Norway (difficult to defend with

conventional; see Baltics now) (Now, cruise missile) Middle East, Central Europe. Fritz Ermath. (Is he always wrong? (see 1983, CIA)

Schles: NU-OPTS was "less miserable" than other options. 360. [But is this escalation really better than just losing?! See preemption. LNW.

"Maybe nuclear war was 'unthinkable.'" (Nothing but massive...)

June 1970 MIRV goes on top of new MMs. Revives CF! (And fear of SU CF, if SS-9's were MIRVd. They weren't; not in SU until 1974). (ABM Gap; MIRV Gap...)

Latter in 1962 (opposing PTB) suggests MM vulnerability if the SU MIRVd. Albert Latter sees it for USAF CF, reports in June 1964.

For McN: MIRV is a way to hold the USAF down to his 1000 MMs, AND to show that ABM will be defeated by SU MIRVs [so he wants prospect of SU MIRV!
"Destabilizing"! It's worse than more MMs (if you could hold both sides down to single-warheads!) (And ABM wouldn't work anyway, without MIRVs: with decoys). AND "penetrates SU ABM" (which doesn't exist, and gets banned—by Nixon!

Another part of McN's compromise with USAF (which wanted more MMs and ABM and testing) in Dec.3 1964 McN goes for more accuracy for MIRVd MM III, hard-target CF. (Why? D-L!) Classified rationale, vs. public rationale (vs. SU ABM). (I'm in ISA, "working" on escalation in VN! NOT pressing the Gilpatric Report, which I would have agreed with. That urges NPT, reduction in warheads: as MIRV is going to explode, after NPT! Shit. (Paul Jacob's principle: don't work inside.)

"In 1962, USAF had requested 2100 MMs. By end of decade, allowed 2100 warheads: 1650 on 55 MM III and 450 MM IIs. CF reborn. (McN held down missiles, but gave them more weapons than they had hoped for years0.

364"

In the late 1960s, the plan [SIOP] still remained essentially the SIOP-63 guidance that Dan Ellsberg had written in the spring of 1961 and that Alain Enthoven and Frank Trinkl had elaborated upon that summer."

In early 60s, Option One of SIOP-63 –destroying the SU strategic nuclear forces—took only a few hundred weapons. Now in 1969, it took a couple of thousand (indistinguishable to SU from all-out attack"—though that assumes many cities included rather than unhit? --"so SU responds with all-out." (Is this US FS?) 365 And this was the smallest option in the SIOP. [Is this Nixon's "90 million dead"?] C3 included, downtown.

[WOW! GET Kaplan, NSSM-3, revised edition, May 8, 1969, "provided to author"!!! AND NSDM-242, JAN. 17, 1973, PROVIDED TO AUTHOR.369

NSSM-3. See N quote, 367. 1970, Strategic Larry Lynn, under Selin when this was done in 1968, moved to NSC and drafted Objectives Study inspired by DE guidance/. p. 366, Ivan Selin "had thoroughly studied McNamara's SIOP-63 guidance and were seeking to apply its basic principles to contemporary conditions. Summer 1968

Revives RAND tradition! So, after McNamara discarded by guidance as declaratory policy and in his own thinking, it's revived under Nixon! AJW pushes options before hitting cities: which he had gotten a decade earlier from AWM and HK. RAND NU-OPTS under Schles, Hoerber and Fritz Ermath: options.

Foster Panel in Jan. 1972 (my trial starting). Limited options, supposedly to revitalize credibility of the US (Type II) deterrent and cohesion of the alliance.

Schles appointed head of national security division at BOB, then chairman of AEC, then, Feb. 1973 (during my trial) head of CIA (where he asks for "family jewels" study, after plumbers exposed: last act.) Then, SecDef?

Fall 1973: NWEF, mixture of CF/no-cities and NU-OPTS. NSDM-242: Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons. "PROVIDED TO AUTHOR"! 370

FU EXPLICIT.

DE: COERCION. Only problem: infeasible. And looks like FS; encourages SU preemption (or US). (As US foresees possible SU preemption, it maintains LOW, on tactical warning...)

[Problem confronting policy-makers wrt war plans from 1945: How to USE the destructive power of nuclear weapons in a way that serves political interest? I.e., to maintain (if not expand) informal empire, including hegemony over allies? Threat of FU and FS has always been the answer. But is there a way to carry out any of these threats, if they don't coerce or deter, without undue risk of national suicide (or omnicide)? Not against a NWS, (SU/Russia)—or, it's turned out, an ally or client of Russia/China.

The negative security assurance has it exactly backward, in terms of non-suicidal policy. "NFU against a NNWS (observing the NPT) unless in alliance with a NWS." Great! A threat can be carried out with some safety ONLY against those that the NSA "guarantees" from attack.

LNW doesn't do it. LSR doesn't do it. Controlled central war (me) doesn't do it. CF/D-L doesn't do it. Decap doesn't do it. Only total withholding fails to make situation worse.

But CF has the advantage of giving the commanders and troops of large strategic forces (desired by services and MIC) a plausible rationale (plausible denial of a

Doomsday Project, a threat of Doomsday, which is what is really being prepared, planned, trained for, and risked.)

"During the 1970 Jordan crisis, he had been particularly frustrated that the SAC war plan contained nothing with which the US might threaten the Soviets in some limited fashion." 370

[See Hersh on Jordan crisis, Nixon orders to Laird to use nucs! HAK asks me in August 1970 to come back to the WH in the fall to discuss "options." Doesn't say what. (We had just discussed my VN options).]"You won't be a WH consultant...but we'll pay your expenses." Two, three broken appointments;]

spring of 1974, HAK wants limited option for a SU invasion of Iran. (See Carter 1980) Why? Not 200 weapons; not 2. (Nothing on Duck Hook in Kaplan?! When was Hersh book out?)

To look "as if" you will use the weapons (Jan Lodol) to deter aggression against allies (Type II): look "mad"; threaten loss of control (with reality); delegate; pretend you believe you can limit damage meaningfully by attacking; buy weapons as if you believe this (and troops will believe it, so they may go).

(Reality: there are no good options, "rational," in a nuclear war. No purpose to be served by launching a nuclear attack.
That's against a NWS.

[The terrible truth, inconvenient truth: There have been and will be situations in which a NWS could have used a nuclear weapons (against a NNWS) without having it escalate, perhaps effectively (or not), and without an international outcry or penalty that can't be handled or endured.
Israel, 1973; Tet 1968; maybe VN 1972;

Fall 1973 (my trial over, Saturday Night massacre...WG hearings over, tapes demanded...) . Aaron against it (CF/FS), but Schles made SecDef in July 1973 (just after my trial); he hires AWM to be head of net assessment office. AWM pushes study of improved accuracy to make SLBMS accurate as ICBMs: Trident II, D-5 (Oigevald) Also brings WWK as speechwriter and adviser. Consultant to Schles in BOB and CIA! QUOTE WWK 373

Schles goes public on Jan. 19, 1974 P. 373 QUOTE (vs. "cities only" chimera; like my BNSP in 1961, Nixon in 1969; now it's 1974, 13 years later. Controversial (plan had never really changed, except all options were very large: thanks to SU buildup, in part.) People believed targeting was AD, cities [FALSE]

WWK recasts it to CF, from LSR (NU-OPTS) (TCS).

Quick ending to war. (NSSM-3?) But HOW GET QUICK ENDING, OR ANY ENDING, WITH SU C3 DESTROYED? (AND US C3?)

(Reagan at least assumes protracted war; but one which will end on "favorable" terms, US prevails!)

Russians were now getting MIRV, so WWK could rationalize new plan as based on SAC vulnerability—MMs—SU may target only our forces (ha ha) so we have to have a comparable capability in our strategic systems and targeting doctrine...:" (BUT this justifies new weapons!!! What McNamara had found! Shit). Posture statement for FY 1975. WWK would say anything. (Athens) But JS knew full CF was infeasible. (He knew "over the Pole" magnetic problems...)

376: JS shrewdly knows CEPs are unreliable, CF won't work: but believes "launching a few nuclear weapons against an aggressor using conventional weapons would probably shock him into stopping and coerce him to the negotiating tables, but that if man more weapons beyond that were used, it was all over: escalation to al-out holocaust was virtually inevitable." {thus, JS wasn't repelled by the two weapons for Iran that shocked HAK as looking "chicken."}

[But if it doesn't force SU to concede? Then we stop, draw back, concede.? Ha. See VN. Dollar auction. See Schelling 334-35.

But Schles (who wanted limited FU) always placed this desire as responding to new strategic weapons by SU or a possible limited FS by SU. Big boost for new bombers and missiles and bigger warheads: B-1, accurate CMs, MX. That's OK with Schles, for "perception": don't let SU have more of anything: MT, throw-weightk MIRVd missiles...

This revitalizes CF advocates, including Nitze, who had negotiating ABM Treaty of 1972 and was member of SALT: he resigns in June, 1974, feeling that Nixon will cave on SALT just to get a politically popular treaty. Sees danger in the new SU MIRVs];which we had provided example for, and taken no step at all to head off!]; SALT II was not dealing with it.

Nitze Jan 1976 FA: SU coercive strike, keeping great MT in reserve, evacuating cities (big CD program) so that our SLBMs would kill "only three or four percent of the total [Soviet] population." [ACTUALLY, NUCLEAR WINTER! OOPS! WELL, WE COULD THREATEN IT!] **See USAF[Kaufmann no cities, 242 QUOTE NITZE 377**

QUESTION: Nitze appears to go crazy in 1974, 1976. WHY? (See Sanders...)

[McNamara talk of need for ability to kill 25% of SU population [20% 30%? 1/3? Actually, 40% planned... NOT JUST GENOCIDE~

T. K. Jones was Nitzes chief technical assistant on the SALT team, from Boeing.

(What was this “growing Soviet threat” in 1975-6 that CPD was worried about? What MIC interests were behind this? (Boeing?) What weapons were wanted? Why Nitze, or others? Schles encouraged, for his defense budget. (See above: all the weapons.)

November 1975, Ford fires Schles (why?) and replaces with Rumsfeld. HAK: Schles was out to torpedo SALT.

Nitze joins Carter even before Iowa, Carter had read his speeches (?);;;; contributed \$750 each with his wife; joined transition team. But Nitze was out, in January, neither he or his friends. (WHY? And those who did get in were opposed.

To Nitze's mind, dangerous men were in power at a perilous time. He began to loathe Jimmy Carter...He felt personally betrayed. (AHA) (But his article was in January!)

World domination. Carter Admin galvanizes CPD/ NSC-68. Now, Russians could deter our deterrent. (With my strategy! Like Athens: FS strategy! Now that SU had CF capability, “superiority.”)

381. SALT-II signed in June, 1979, Nitze goes on warpath. Crazy. MM endangered by SU superiority in MT.

[How much was Carter looking toward 1980: desire for a treaty to be ratified before election?] Country into RAND-type debate on single-shot kill probabilities, SAC vulnerability (TOTAL HOAX

382: “The central ideas of the nuclear strategists—that nuclear war could be calculated with precision [or controlled, by either side!], that SAC vulnerability was the central threat of our time [R-290, Gaither], and that the US had to build up a strong counterforce capability—emerged as the conventional wisdom.”
(378: Nitze had been the strongest opponent of the Kaysen/Rowen CF plan; and against FU over Berlin. See my talk with him about JSCP in 1960! And 1961! “It was all rather odd.”)

388: Reagan admin was great for using “madman strategy” (they WERE mad). But did he get any concessions out of it? (Gorbachev didn't later make concessions—at all, really—because he thought Reagan mad, or was scared of him! Or of US FS). Did Andropov concede anything? Rather: they pressed arms race (which had stupidly proceeded earlier, anyway) and prepared to preempt, watching for strategic intelligence on (illusory) US FS! Reagan made US FS all too plausible, insane though it would be!

Talk of winning limited war. Haig on demo shot. Rostow on Japan recovery.

Kaplan properly critical, of RAND-type analyses:

359 Nu-OPTS

AJW, ABM: 354-358

Friday, January 29, 2016

{The obvious chaos that would result from the explosion [I have to find a word for “use” that distinguish explosions from threats: attacks?] of just two or three nuclear warheads has kept them from being launched in combat for seventy years: that, and the fear of the precedent, and the changes in relationships and images that would result.

Lombardi: “Football is not a contact sport. It is a collision sport.” Nuclear weapons are an instrument of threats, not of attacks. Nuclear threats are among the “admixture of other means” that the nuclear era includes in politics and war, both. (“War is the continuation of politics with an admixture of other means.” Since Hiroshima, nuclear attacks have not been among the means of war, nuclear threats, yes, and among the means of “diplomacy” as well (often as a substitute for war, othert times not).

Superfluous destructiveness²⁶

[Power of Bomb can encourage aggression, preventive war; OR, fear of retaliation can prevent war (or, nuclear attacks. (Temptation to print “use” distinctively, for attacks. USE?]

In Sept. 1945, Viner believes: retaliation is certain, “in equal terms” [yes and no!], so the Bomb is a war deterrent, a peace-making force.” [Between US and SU: it has been, even though “equal”retaliation was not possible, against the US, for twenty years; but it was imagined to be possible for most of that period after 1949 (and before that, SU imagined overwhelming conventional force was a counter-deterrent: occupation of Europe countering devastation of USSR). Not entirely “peace”, but war only between proxies.

Viner and Brodie wrong at first that (with Bomb scarcity) only cities were efficient targets—nuclear plenty set in by early Fifties—yet cities were at least collateral damage (actually, bonus in SAC eyes), by “superfluous destructiveness.”

So Viner thought, “surprise” had no benefit, going first. True, since mid-Sixties, really: yet not recognized, on grounds that Destruction I (the damage suffered from going first), however terrible, is less bad than Destruction II. [Again, I need better

terms for this distinction. Viner's view would also favor "minimum deterrence," and "deterrence only" (Type I deterrence, i.e.: another unavoidable distinction/term). Viner was right, since mid-Sixties, and Brodie was convinced (The Absolute Weapon: armed services have no other purpose than to prevent war, Type I: i.e., no rational purpose during war! But see above.)

Yet this has never taken hold in military or political thinking or practice. Partly because it doesn't serve the MIC or service interest to recognize it. Partly because leaders still want to "use" the bomb for threats, and would prefer to pretend to believe that USE could be rational.

(Viner was ignoring that the Bomb could be USED to destroy the enemy's Bombs. Issue: to what extent could one's bombs be made mobile or hidden (or undersea)?

Viner assumption: No significant difference between, say, destruction somewhat less than Russian losses in WWII (20M) or much more. AJW assumed it did make a big difference to the Russians. And in their efforts to be capable of CF, preserve C3, and even CD (however pro forma), they seemed to act on this. (Did it make a big enough difference to them to encourage preemption? For over twenty years, that didn't show up (in alert procedures...); later, yes. (See Andropov, 1983).²⁷

³⁴ Brodie: "War is unthinkable but not impossible, and therefore we must think about it." (1946?

If each side had thousands of bombs, a three-to-one superiority wouldn't mean much, but what if each side had only hundreds? Then it might.

USBSS: galbraith, Ball, Nitze, Burton Klein, (Kaysen in Economic objectives unit, picking targets: Rostow?)

In daylight, RAF bombers could see targets, but AA and fighters could see planes! Made a virtue of necessity, described "morale" as the target. 1/5 of German housing destroyed, 300,000 civilians killed, 780,000 wounded (600,000? Bastian: 1 million) Virtually no effect on war effort. American precision bombing: only 20% of bombs fell within target area, within 1000 feet of target.³⁶ In 1944, peak year of bombing, German war production exceeded all previous years. (German war industry had great room for expansion: expected short war). City bombing had been a complete waste. Brodie Aug 15, \1950, Reporter on SB.

Vandenberg COS, and Nostad, Vice Chief, were not wedded to city busting.

Su bomb at end of August, 1949. Six months later, JIC predicted SU would build up a force sufficient to attack the US, and that they they "may attack...at the earliest possible moment...at an time they assessed that it was to their advantage" to do so.

³⁹ Dec. 49: US had slightly fewer than 300 atom bombs.

June, 1950: Korea. JCS believed it was a diversion, for invasion of Western Europe and perhaps the ME too. Atomic war with the SU was not merely possible but almost certain. 39.

1946 SAC created; shortly after USAF independent. Vandenberg's assistants in Air Intelligence Division devised a concept called "killing a nation." (Specific industries on which war machine depended. Liquid fuel and electric power. Atomic energy plants. Delta: Disruption of the vital elements. Bravo: blunting of SU capabilities to deliver an atomic offensive. Romeo retardation of SU advances in to Western Eurasia.

But LeMay/SAC hated notion of separating out specific industrial centers was disastrous.⁴² In Japan, JCS wanted specific industries hit; but weather didn't permit precision bombing; LeMay targeted industrial **areas**, square miles "that's all he could hit. "

Arnold asked when the war would be over: LeMay ordered his officers "to count how many square miles they had left to hit, how many bombs it takes...how long..." "The war will be over the first of September." When XXI Bomber Command would run out of targets to hit. "

⁴³ To LeMay, demolishing everything was how you win a war. He thought that strategic bombing in Europe had been handled all wrong, too much fussing with 'bottleneck' targets and 'precision bombing,' [Harris: vs. "panacea" attacks] that the whole point of strategic bombing was to be massive, a campaign of holy terror." [WRONG in Europe, USBSS>

LeMay takes over SAC in 1948 from Kenney. Attack **industrial complexes**, cities.

SAC EWP 1-49: "deliver the entire stockpile of atomic bombs...in a single massive attack, " 133 A-bombs on 70 cities in 30 days. (atomic power and electric power were too isolated, outside cities, and couldn't be located). Douhet: airpower would win war. (Billy Mitchell). (Brodie: ground had been needed). Doubtful collapse, killing a nation, Sunday punch. LeMay hated "reserve forces." Wanted "concentration of attack."

Brodie, early: when SU got bombs, US may want to preempt; or "to hold our bombs as a threat to induce them to hold his." (1948? 46) In 1950, see [SIOP-62 in SAC's plan, Brodie had same reaction as mine! Marcyh 1951, slowing down delivery rate of bombs, "of deliberately avoiding the destruction of Soviet cities, at least in the first phase of the war.. The reasoning harkened back to Brodie's 1948 speech in Chicago: there was 'more strategic leverage to be gained in holding cities hostages than in making corpses.'" (Me, 1961!) Brodie thought implicit threat of A-bombs on Japan had produced surrender [NO]. "Likewise, the Soviets would more likely stop fighting after receiving some destructive blows, knowing that if they did not stop, their cities would be the next targets to get hit. [MORE likely, yes; but not likely.]

Concept “sacrificing the prospect of total victory, but...for the future that might be a small price to pay for the sake of avoiding total war.” (i.e. SU attacks on US cities, too.

First thought of “intrawar deterrence,” [requiring continued control, as well as reserves and avoidance of cities: and assuming SAC FS doesn’t destroy all SU forces.]⁴⁸ Need “wisdom and science in determining what *not* to hit,” and “in determining what can be achieved by war, and in what way, other than by unleashing destruction on an unlimited basis.”

[But this—my plan—was as infeasible as RAF initial plans for precision bombing, or USAAF.”

But Air Force couldn’t stand idea that war would not be total, not trying to destroy as much SU p[roperty and kill as many communists as possible, total war as something to avoid rather than to “prevail” in, all “seemed naïve and foolish.” Brodie initially supported by Vandenberg, but then fired (perhaps on influence of Edward Meade Earle.]

[USAF/SAC principle: to deter/prevent nuclear war, you must be able to convince SU that you (believe, the more plausibly the better) can “prevail” in nuclear war, all-out war. (Pipes: SU believes this is possible, that they could do this, and they are preparing to do it, depriving us of ability to do it by a preemptive strike: hence we must (?) develop our own ability to do this, or convince them we believe we can do it: for what? Type II det, FS capability (to win confrontations, threatening FU if necessary)

Shils in Sept. 1945: “What kind of men will be willing to work in this centrally important field in peacetime when they know that all they do is intended for war, and that all they can do can confer on mankind only the dubious benefits of a victory in an atomic bomb war?”

(Melman to me, 1959. BUT aim was to prevent either attack on US OR attack on Europe, to deter it, by planning how to fight it so as to limit damage and/or “prevail”) AND, for USAF, to get budget money away from Navy, for new planes and R&D. Yet, Kahn and some USAF did appear to believe that actually fighting a nuclear war could be made and be worthwhile in some circumstances. (never, me).

DRESDEN: 54. “When he heard that Secretary of War Simson had doubts about the bombing of Dresden, Arnold wrote a memorandum: “We must not get soft. War must be destructive and to a certain extent inhuman and ruthless.” He wanted his scientists to invent “explosives more terrible and more horrible than anyone has any idea of.”

A disciple of Billy Mitchell. Saw ICBMs as the future in early 1945.

RAND: preferred methods, techniques and instrumentalities” for “air war.” March 1, 1946. Under leMay.

RAND: access to secrets, higher pay than government, no university obligations, no orders from military officers. Brilliant minds to solve fascinating problems. (Child Buy er)> anarchic, interdisciplinary, almost no hierarchy.

Von Neumann: bitter hatred of Communism (like Teller) "Which also allowed him—in contrast with Oppenheimer and others "to work enthusiastically on the H-bomb project with no moral qualms. "I think that the USA-USSR conflict will very probably lead to an armed 'total' collision, and that a maximum rate of armament is therefore imperative." To Strauss in November, 1951. (Teller-Ulam invention in May, 1951.) 63 (quote somewhere: there can't be a bomb too big.)

FK says that John Williams (from Olaf Helmer) was encouraged to promote a social science and economics departments at RAND by his interest in game theory. (poorly explained by FK. 67

Hitch in WWII: only 1/3 to 1/2 of bombs dropped in RAF night bombing hit the right city. 71. Those that did strike targets damaged German economy only slightly (overestimated effect). Except for liquid fuels and transport in end of war.

Williams: interest in identifying, measuring and control of factors important in (1) the occurrence of war, and (2) the winning of war if it should occur." {deterrence? And peacetime coercion.]

Warren Weaver: interest (by all attending) in "the rational life...having some knowledge...and some analysis of problems, as compared with living in a state of ignorance, superstition and drifting-into-whatever-may come."

[Bias toward lesser evils, optimal solutions to all problems, believing in rationality of enemy (and existence of "enemies") ("rational enemies"!) and rationality of one's own government (preferably, centralized control).

[On McGeorge Bundy and York on deterrence: Could a civilian head of state be led to preempt? (if large-scale retaliation is certain? I.e., always for SU; from 1964 for US (aside from Europe). 1983 indicates "yes": if it's true about Andropov. Then, it's not enough (AJW 1960) to assure large-scale retaliation (e.g., SU WWII, 20 million; or even, nuclear winter? ("according to their 'models': compared to certainty of reducing the enemy operational warheads remaining!)]

AJW: what if SU gets in first blow? (e.g., preempting). (Unreal in 1950-64-74) I.e., SAC neither gets FS nor preemption.

Paxon 86-88)

(how quantify the probability of "something going wrong" in every different element, without knowing how it could go wrong? Ambiguous. (especially without tests, operations, prototypes, at least games...)87 (lack of real data) (for WWII) new meaning of "empirical" (AJW: like Dad's "Science" (Christian). Meaning hypothetical,

quantitative. (unlike Social Science Division). Weapons of the future. (even, especially, price. All wrong). **RAND R errors (discovered by me in 1970).**

89 Turboprop rather than turbojet engine. (cheap turboprop could do more damage, for a fixed budget, than turbojet)> USaf hated: Pilots "liked to fly airplanes. They wanted a bomber that could go highet, fathest, fastest." Turbojet.

AJW: Bases closest to SU allowed turbojets (cheap enough); but were more vulnerable to SU attack. (WHAT WOULD SU do if it were "completely rational"? (Not best question, after all). 91 RAND into game theory in 1950-51. (I'm being critical!)

RJW finishes classified Pearl Harbor study in 1957 (just before I come). (Ambiguity of intelligence: "noise"! Importance of surprise attack: we might not see attack coming. SAC's overseas bases as Pearl Harbor (wrt Japanese) to SU wanting to attack West Europe. 92 **SAC 'which had, after all, been designed primarily to counter a Soviet attack against Europe.'** !!!! (Like basis battleships and carriers in Pearl Harbor, to deter Japanese attack on Southeast Asia for oil: or to provoke attack?! Yipe!) (Thus, importance of the **vulnerability of our Type II deterrence forces**: which might provoke SU attack on them. And if they were based in the US ZI, (which AJW strongly supported!) it would cancel out Type I deterrence!) Concentrated target "invites" preemptive attack (IF SU has force: which they did for overseas bases!) Even with A-bombs: 40 kt. 99

93 WSEG first report had raised possibility that overseas bases in England might be "Pearl Harbored" at outset. LeMay agreed: he wanted intercontinental bomber force, no foreign bases critical. But USAF didn't take vulnerability seriously in Fifties: rather, initiative, offensive. (Intelligence! But also, wishful.)

AJW 19 years older than me (a possible father).

By early 1952, AJW has his insight about vulnerability of overseas bases.: to A - bombs. BUT Brodie, etc. are discovering the implications of H-bombs! (Did they tell AJW? Almost surely not!) Briefings in January 1953... (after H test) R-244S (S closely held) SAC had assumed enough warning to get planes off the ground. 193 (ambiguity)

LeMay: if bombers were vulnerable, get more of them and "make sure to get in the initial blow instead of waiting around for the Soviets to strike first." 104

[Ignoring nature of H-bomb,[the scale of retaliation by a few bombs] AJW sees vulnerability as an "invitation". And as a Trot, his view of the SU... [check Leites]

105 With Vandenberg dying of cancer, Thomas White was acting chief; they set up briefing with White (AJW, Collbohm, Henderson, Goldstein: "highest level end run

around the Air Force bureaucracy thjat any one could imagine.” AHA—precedent for me.0 August 1953. Same month that, on August 8, Malenkov announces first SU “hydrogen bomb.” (not really: but 400 kt (order of magnitude higher than AJW assumed!) AJW exploits. October, Air Council supports study of vulnerability.

April 1954: R-266 Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases. Already implementing. But RAND recommendations for alternatives were now somewhat obsolete. (AJW still didn’t know of RAND H-bomb study of early 1952; but warned by Hitch about 1MT explosions, or larger. LeMay wants B-52.

[me: “You can’t know too many secrets.” (But you can’t look as though you’re prying.)

Arnold wanted RAND for the ICBM. **[YET ICBMS WERE EXACTLY WHAT ARMS AGREEMENTS SHOULD HAVE PREVENTED, FOR US VULNERABILITY! NO H; NO ICBM; NO MIRV. (Efficient A-warheads on SLBMs would have been ideal).**

Summer of 1953, Plesset and Griggs learning from Los Alamos that H-bomb warheads could be made small enough to fit on ICBM. 111

[Assumption throughout period: 125n: No negotiation is feasible, no arms control, to induce the SU to forego the advantage of having H-bomb, ICBM (later, MIRV): by foregoing this advantage ourselves (as Fermi and Rabi had hinted in 1949 about H). Even for SU to reduce its vulnerability to a US FS; or to avoid an arms race. Never addressed.] (Nor in Sept. 1961, when it is found that SU hasn’t produced ICBMs even without an agreement, despite their lead in testing one.)]

August 8 1953: The USSR tests “Joe-4,” a nuclear weapon that involves some fusion reactions but was not a “true” H-bomb. It was a very big bomb (400 kt, still less than the all-fission Ivy KING), but the design could not be scaled into the megaton range. Still, a big bomb, and it could be dropped from existing Soviet bombers. But, contains lithium, refrigeration unnecessary: so Augenstein infers that Soviets could build an ICBM with an H-bomb warhead much earlier thanb US. “catastrophic.” (Kaplan 113

Augustine: with smaller, lighter H warheads, reduce requirement for weight of warhead for Atlas, to 1500 lbs instead of 3000 lbs, relax CEP to 3 miles, even 5 miles (not 1). US could have ICBM by 1950, not 1965. Dec. 12, 1953, briefing. 115 Augenstein Report Feb. 8, 1954, beating von neumann’s Teapot report by two days.

AJW hears about this in fall of 1953: makes base study irrelevant. But ICBM would make SAC vulnerable in new ways. So follow-on study needed. Jan 1954 start (\$-266 comes out in April, outmoded!)

Against ICBM attack (by end of R-266 period: 1960?) "then our advertised capability for retaliation will be fictitious...." Sac could not "hurt the Russians very much." 118 Soviets could destroy at least 80% of SAC bombers with a force of about 150 missiles, less than one-third the number of missiles that Air Force Intelligence was predicting the Russians would have by 1960." [500: 125 times what they had in 1960-61!] [Plus 500 Bear and Bison] [RAND's "moderately high" SU force. But given low accuracy, put bombers in blast shelters. Weidlinger. 200 psi.

Against 300 SU bombers and 250 ICBMs, with second wave of 500 additional bombers, SAC's "planned system could kill about 15% of the population in the 270 largest Soviet cities, given a \$3.4 billion budget, whereas the RAND system could kill about 90%." 121 (pop. Killed?) R-290, Protecting the US Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s.

Some in RAND social science division, in DC, "wondered whether the Kremlin leaders really were prone to such risky maneuverings, who were skeptical that war would come with a bolt-from-the-blue surprise attack, as R-290 assumed. Scientific"—maybe the numbers were questionable, but they were tangible, unlike the theorizing, the Kremlinology, the academic historical research and interpretation produced by social science. AJW snootily denigrated all such works as being in "the essay tradition."

"Through Wohlstetter's own personal influence with RAND, vulnerability began to loom as the preoccupying issue, the virtual obsession, of strategic analysis." 122

RAND, not USAF/JCS, as I found! (Navy, more!) AJW on the "coming vulnerability of the strategic retaliatory force." BUT it was NOT a realistic problem, it turned out! [UNLESS the AFCIN estimates—for a bigger Air Force!—were right!]

[124: We were involved in "saving the world." See tone of the CULT (vs. the USAF cult!): 122-124.]

R-290: Sept. 1, 1956

Early 50's (when?) Fallout recognized as crucial problem: SU H-bombs may kill tens of millions, more than 100, M, maybe everybody (without fallout shelters...) 126 Jan. 57, FCDA recommends massive shelter program: more than \$30B. or \$45B April 8 1964 Ike approves NSC approval of study (Gaither report): "relative value of various active and passive measures to protect the civil population in case of nuclear attack and its aftermath, taking into account probable new weapons systems." 126 (Before sputnik and ICBM test). Rockefeller already obsessed with CD: they "will to resist" was central in deterring the enemy (chairman of Psy Warfare Panel). "the side preserving its manpower resources and maintaining its will to

resist would have a major advantage" (after a surprise attack! Infeasible, irrelevant1) Ike: Presidential commission recommended by Rockefeller. Killian, science adviser, president of MIT, recommends Gaither, president of Ford. May 8, Gaither accepts. Gaither, chairman of board of RAND, asks AJW for advice (briefing R-290). AJW: vulnerability of SAC was most critical issue facing the country [SEE CLIMATE TODAY, and new arms race! And new Cold War!] far more critical than civil defense [ACTUALLY, NEITHER!]; G. should broaden mandate to include the problem of second-strike capability (deter!); G agrees, and Sprague and Baxter. Committee starts on problem in September, when Gaither goes into hospital with cancer: Sprague and Foster take over. HK consultant. (Denied special clearance: SI? He had Q. because of wife's CP relatives.) HK briefs Spurgeon Keeney, who incorporates R-290 on strategic policy.

Oct. 4, Sputnik. Staff groups had already turned in their papers on civil defense, missiles, ABM, strategic policy. Steering panel, now feeling even more urgent, needs to hype up condensed report. 136 Baxter recruits Nitze to draft it. (controversial, because a Democrat, and foe of Dulles). (in effect, on steering committee, low profile). Need for conventional buildup for gray areas. NSC 141, Jan. 19, 1953, with Bissell, signed by Acheson and Lovett, to NSC one day before hst left office. (Ike rejected conventional buildup; but it dealt with Cd.

Nitze, in NSC-68 1950, Gaither Report 1957: "Here again was an Administration that refused to sacrifice old-fashioned notions of balanced budgets for the needs of national security in the face of a menacing Soviet threat. Here again was a specially appointed committee that just might change things all around. It was time to write another hair-raiser." 141. [AND I HELPED NITZE IN 1961! And see MM program as Keynesian! Arthur Smithies! (desmond Ball) (Harvard econ!) Was Nitze a Wall St. Keynesian?! SANDERS MISSES GAITHER REPORT AS, IN EFFECT, CPD-IB! JFK ADMIN! Nitze vs. hst, then Ike, then Carter!

Trigger to NSC-68 (Nitze) is Russian A-bomb and prospect of H; to Gaither, ICBM (based on successful H); to CPD-II, accurate SU MIRVs (1974) (and see loss of Iran, Jan. 79). NOW, what? (Crimea/Ukraine;

Gaither: an increasing threat...critical in 1959 or early 1960. {NO} Vulnerability of SAC to surprise attack "during a period of lessened world tension" [EXACTLY WHAT ANDROPOV FEARED IN 1983]

(The ruthless, calculating, "rational" (Leites, Bolshevik Code) SU, very hard to deter, was actually AJW's and USAF/SAC's "preferred SU"—for all AJW's scorn at the thought of "The Air Force-preferred SU attack." This was the RAND-preferred SU enemy—good for USAF (though USAF had a different response in mind! Preemption!]

[Yet Gaither Committee, in recommending Atlas, Titan and IRBMs (vulnerable) were acting AS IF they really wanted a FS force! (As in 1981!) Don't let SU have a FS

capability that we don't have! Appearance of "parity" in FS force is necessary: for Type II, yes, though Gaither claims to be worried about Type I! Also CD. Sounds more like HK than AJW! (AJW and WWK warn against IRBMs; as do I in Crude Analysis).

\And—Nitze—conventional war capability. (But this is not for Europe, but for gray areas...) Extra \$44B over next five years.

But again, Team B/CPD-II in 1977-80: Vs. Carter! (who wants to reduce military budget!) And CPD-II goes for CD (and ABM/SDI), FS cap, like Gaither! (Again, Nitze: who IS worried about effects on our "will" in confrontations; and FU (vs. Kennan, in 1950): for ME! Oil! (As AJW joins, after RAND! ABM, CD, discrim. Deterrence—i.e. extended deterrence—and ME!) (Wolfowitz, Persian Gulf). A

[I thought Ike was asleep: as did Gaither steering committee: which raises question which of them knew, any more than AJW, HK or me, about SI and U-2! Explanation for leMay and Ike "complacency"! And not knowing, we were getting frantic! (Given assumptions that AFCIN estimates were valid, AND that assumptions of SU "world domination" aim and ruthlessness (about SU casualties, even more than about US casualties) (and SU CD—Goure) and irrelevance/infeasibility of negotiated arms control were valid.

We didn't even know of Army/Navy doubts about SU ICBMs (or bombers). (Ike's doubts and complacency were attributed solely to his concern about cost and government spending! Not about possibility that he was RIGHT about the SU threat! JFK and we were wrong; but Ike had been right! For same reasons as Army-Navy were right! (USAF conceivably could have been right: if the actual evidence, positive and negative, had been totally misleading, as was possible, but not... See WMDs in Iraq; Tonkin Gulf attacks... Hawks were LYING when they said evidence was "unequivocal"—when it was not only ambiguous, it was wrong!

[Consider: periods where a few insiders know a secret, their colleagues don't: Manhattan Project (MP); prospect of H-bomb; reality of situation in July, 1945; small number of A-bombs (but belief by a few at the top that monopoly will last); inner controversy about H-bomb; feasibility of H-bomb; first and second tests (?); prospect of ICBM; belief in deterrence gap, missile gap (RAND, me; Gaither committee); U-2; SI; reality of "stable imbalance of terror" (Ike! Army-Navy); SAC focus on FS, preemption; real FU threats; (relation of FS to FU threats); plans for Hundred Holocausts; VN decision-making, 1961, 1964-65-68; Nixon plans and threats; delegation (vs. plans for decapitation: public!); MongOOSE, invasion plans; (K's secret: tac nucs: stayed secret, no effect);

From March, 1951 on (Teller-Ulam), prospect of "unacceptable damage" (tens-hundreds of millions dead in US, given estimates) from FS or esc. from FU vs. SU. Bluffs; yet preparation for preemption and escalation, and possibility of it. Dangerous bluffs. (Danger to humanity, plus).

[Danger from Apes Like Us, ALU (not gorillas, chimpanzees, orangutans, bonobos) cf. plu (class, ethnicity, of humans). Sociopathic leaders, organizations, groups.

Missile gap: JOE Alsop Oct. 1959:

<https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1310&dat=19591013&id=5xZWAAAAI BAJ&sjid=8eIDAAAIBA&pg=7129,2270259&hl=en>

Bomber gap:

First flying soon after the first flight of the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress, the M-4 was first displayed to the public in Red Square, on May Day, 1954. The aircraft was a surprise to the United States, which had not known that the Soviets had built a jet bomber.^[4] However, it soon became clear that the bomber had an insufficient range to attack the United States and still return to the Soviet Union. Only a few of the original production M-4s were actually put into service. To remedy this problem, the Myasishchev design bureau introduced the **3M**, known to the West as the 'Bison-B', which was considerably more powerful than the previous version. This new model first flew in 1955. Among other things, two of the five original gun barbettes were removed to lighten the aircraft.

In July 1955 American observers saw 28 Bisons in two groups during a Soviet air show. The United States government believed that the bomber was in mass production, and the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that 800 would be available by 1960. The display was a hoax (maskirovka); the first group of ten repeated the flyby with eight more. The classified estimates led, however, to American politicians warning of a "bomber gap".^[4]

The "**bomber gap**" was the unfounded belief in the Cold War-era United States that the Soviet Union's Long Range Aviation had gained an advantage in deploying jet-powered strategic bombers. Widely accepted for several years, the gap was used as a political talking point in order to justify greatly increased defense spending. One result was a massive buildup of the United States Air Force bomber fleet, which peaked at over 2,500 bombers, in order to counter the perceived Soviet threat. Surveillance flights utilizing the Lockheed U-2 aircraft indicated that the bomber gap did not exist. Realizing that mere belief in the gap was an extremely effective funding source, a series of similarly nonexistent Soviet military advances were constructed in a tactic now known as "policy by press release." These included claims of a nuclear-powered bomber,^[1] supersonic VTOL flying saucers,^[2] and only a few years later, the "missile gap."

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Appearance of the Bomber gap

On February 15, 1954, Aviation Week published an article describing new Soviet jet bombers capable of carrying a nuclear bomb to the United States from their bases in Russia.^[3] The aircraft they referred to was the Myasishchev M-4 Bison. Over the next year and a half these rumors were debated publicly in the press, and soon after in the United States Congress.^[4]

Adding to the concerns was an infamous event in July 1955. At the Soviet Aviation Day demonstrations at the Tushino Airfield, ten Bison bombers were flown past the reviewing stand, then flew out of sight, quickly turned around, and flew past the stands again with eight more, presenting the illusion that there were 28 aircraft in the flyby. Western analysts extrapolated from the illusionary 28 aircraft, judging that by 1960 the Soviets would have 800.^[5]

At the time, the USAF had just introduced its own strategic jet bomber, the B-52 Stratofortress, and the shorter-range B-47 Stratojet was still suffering from a variety of technical problems that limited its availability. USAF staff started pressing for accelerated production of the B-52, but it also grudgingly accepted calls for expanded air defense.^[6] The Air Force was generally critical of spending effort on defense, having studied the results of the World War II bombing campaigns and concluding that Stanley Baldwin's pre-war thinking on the fruitlessness of air defense was correct: the bomber almost always did get through. Like the British, they concluded that money would better be spent on making the offensive arm larger, deterring an attack. The result was a production series consisting of thousands of aircraft. Over 2,000 B-47s and almost 750 B-52s were built to match the imagined fleet of Soviet aircraft.

Gap disproven

President Dwight D. Eisenhower was skeptical of the gap from the start. With no evidence one way or the other, he agreed to the development of the Lockheed U-2 to answer the question.^[7]

The first U-2 flights started in 1956. One early mission, Mission 2020 flown by Martin Knutson on July 4, 1956,^[8] flew over Engels-2 airfield near Saratov and photographed 20 M-4 Bison bombers on the ramp. Multiplying by the number of Soviet bomber bases, the intelligence suggested the Soviets were already well on their way to deploying hundreds of aircraft. Ironically, the U-2 had actually photographed the *entire* Bison fleet; there wasn't a single bomber at any of the other bases.^[9] Similar missions over the next year finally demonstrated this beyond a doubt, and at least in official circles the gap disappeared.^[5]

As it was later discovered, the M-4 was unable to meet its original range goals and was limited to about 8,000 kilometers (5,000 mi). Unlike the United States, at that time the Soviets lacked overseas bases in the Western Hemisphere and therefore the M-4 would not be able to attack the US and land at a friendly airbase. Interest in the M-4 waned, and a total of only 93 were produced before the assembly lines were shut down in 1963. The vast majority of these were used as tankers or maritime reconnaissance aircraft; only the original 10 shown at the air show and nine newer 3MD13 models served on nuclear alert.^[10]

Monday, February 1, 2016

FK, 155: Sept. 30, 1957 (just before Oct. 4, Sputnik): air force panel to White, COS, SU “major objectives were ‘first, destroy or neutralize US capabilities and nuclear retaliatory forces; and second, to deliver an attack on urban, industrial, political and psychological targets in the US so as to prevent mobilization of the US weapons potential.”

\Nov. 12 57 after Sputnik) NIE: **SU could have 500 operational ICBMs** by the end of 1962, or if a crash program, by end 1961. SAC: maybe up to 1000. Atlas scheduled for 24 in 1960, 65 by 1961: AFCIN and CIA. But estimate sprang from demise of worries about a bomber gap.

Hoax by SU (starts arms race?): on July 13, 1955, USSR’s Aviation Day: ten Bisons, then nine then another nine: 28. Est. SU had about twice that number actually built; 1956 NIE predicted 500 bombers (maybe 600-800) 4 or 5 years in future.

Assumption: SU primary goal was to attack strategic and U-I targets in US: would need about 500 intercontinental range bombers to do this; evidence interpreted to fit this assumption about SU aims. **[IF they wanted to invade Europe (intact!) in the interest of world domination: need to eliminate SAC at outset, just as Yamamoto wanted to eliminate US fleet at Pearl Harbor at outset of his drive south for oil.]**

Ed Proctor disputes in 1957. **[AWM tells me about Proctor and Pete Scoville on missiles.]** If they were building half as many or less, then assumption on aims was wrong—unless (later) they were building missiles instead. No one questioned assumption.: not CIA, either. 160-161. So bomber gap ended and missile gap began: same “need” for missiles (500). November 1957.above.

(See HK to me: materiel for bombers used instead for missiles.)

USAF needs estimate of large SU air force for a large USAF air force, prestige and budget (and USAF jobs, promotions). (MIC?) CIA-AFCIN fight over bombers: until Oct. 4 sputnik and K bragging about ICBMs. But these allowed USAF to keep assumption about SU aims and USAF large program needed, just against ICBMs instead of bombers.

[If no bomber gap—then missile gap! Only two hypotheses: if evidence rejected one, it supported the other, “zero-sum credibility”. SU had “need and capability” for 500 vehicles, as soon as possible [what was the rush? US buildup?]. USAF had really believed bomber estimates: on the basis of “evidence,” plus the assumption on aims, which was unchallenged after negative evidence on bomber building was finally accepted, given possibility that aim was to be fulfilled by missiles instead.

But by mid-1958 (I at RAND) Pete Scoville, CIA science and technology (missile specialists) noted that SU ICBM testing had slowed. "How long do you wait for something to happen before you conclude that it isn't going to happen?" 162. It's Rusmfield's (AWM's) axiom: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (i.e., not proof of absence; of course, it's "evidence" of absence IF you accept absence as "possible" (ICBMs, WMDs).

USAF belief that CIA was underestimating ICBMs and even tests (USAF may have been counting tests of shorter-range missiles, in summer 1958) (Turkey radar). Otherwise their request for massive missile program was endangered. Symington –critic of Ike's defense policies, former SecAir Force, wanted Gaither Report released, hoping for presidential (or VP?) nomination in 1960 (possible in 1964); relies on Col. Lanphier, now asst. to president of Convair, maker of Atlas. Challenges Dulles.

[RAND doesn't get estimate of Feb. 9, 1959: only 50 ICBM<s by mid-1960, 35 on launchers; mid-61, between 175-270, 140-200 on launchers...CIA lower numbers. Footnotes, Army-Navy: only 50 by mid-1961, 125 by mid-62, 200 by mid-63.

But their estimates suspect: service bias (and Navy estimator, regular low bias) 166. And with their estimates, SAC wasn't vulnerable (and SU aim would be challenged or discarded).

But USAF had now come to accept R-290 and Gaither on vulnerability (LeMay replaced by Power at time of Gaither: Nov. 1957?) James Walsh: 1957-61 assistant chief of staff for intelligence (gap?): July 1971, chief of staff at SAC. (I saw?) No.: General George J. Keegan was assigned to Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., in April 1961, as deputy chief and later chief of the Air Estimates Division, Directorate of Intelligence. He graduated from Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., with a bachelor of arts degree in 1947, and received his master's degree in international affairs from The George Washington University in 1965. From April 1953 to June 1957, General Keegan was assigned as chief of the Special Studies Group, Directorate of Intelligence, Headquarters U.S. Air Force. During that period he was the author of several major studies on Soviet science, education and strategy; lectured extensively at all of the nation's war colleges; served as a member of Secretary Stassen's Disarmament Staff in the White House; was Air Force liaison officer on Senator Symington's Defense Hearings; and later was an aide at the White House.

So it was Keegan I saw at SAC.

"Closing the Missile Gap, CIA

In April 1961, Penkovslciy had his first face-to-face sessions with his

British and American case officers. In an Information Report of 16 May 1961, Penkovskiy described the "missile gap" is a hoax. Khrushchev, he said, was more interested in fostering the impression that the Soviet Union already had a tremendous ICBM program when in fact it was practically nonexistent. Penkovskiy cautioned that the USSR would eventually have many missiles because "millions of men's efforts are directed to this work," and the "entire economy of a nation is directed by a one-party system to which all is subordinate."⁴¹

USAF had accepted dispersal and airborne alert: not hardening of bombers, which would take money from budget from first two (vulnerability meant to them, more bombers, and missiles (which they were willing to harden). Air alert: flight pay, morale, new bombers to replace those worn out.

Recommendations and predictions are 'accepted' when, and to the extent that they could be reinterpreted to support USAF desired programs/aims. Bureaucratic politics model in terms of estimates: ambiguity resolved in terms of wishfulness, desired programs. 166n.

Pessimism, or supposed "worse case" estimates, really represented wishfulness, Service interests/optimism! (As did, the more realistic Army-Navy estimates: their own service interests produced "optimism," but did not blind them to the significance of the negative evidence, the lack of evidence for "worst case.")

"To spend money on offense, not defense, was practically dogma in Air Force circles." 167

[Note: AJW was assuming that Type I deterrence was the goal—destroying an "adequate number" of urban targets (despite his later scorn for the Bishops' "immorality" and minimum deterrence)—and wanted to do this without assuming preemption, i.e., at most tactical warning or even "riding out" attack (if no warning). But this not only meant a smaller number of (protected) bombers or missiles, which USAF didn't want, it ignored USAF real aims: Type II deterrence, FS, or if necessary preemption. For the latter, it WAS "FS cap" that was relevant, depending both on numbers of (possibly soft) US vehicles, before attack, and the state of SU vehicles (number and soft).

Army-Navy figures: no missile gap, no SAC vulnerability; and mistaken assumption of SU aims (never questioned in 1961-62, because of K pressure on Berlin, then Cuba). By 1963, when SU had many missiles, US would have Polaris and MM hardened. Chance for SU FS would have passed (though still—to this day—preemption on strong tac warning).

For "aggressive" —world domination—FS, damage from retaliation must be small (really, very small); for preemption, military, at least, acts as if it's only necessary to reduce the

level of catastrophe, even if survival of social system is impossible (vs. HK), as it would be, even apart from Nuc winter. (That's the implication of 1983: and of force preparations, forces, alert levels, on both sides: for intimidation/bluff? "Keeping other uncertain"? MIC/Service morale? (latter, at least).

What Senate, Gaither, RAND, didn't know: origins of missile gap (failure of bomber gap); dependence on axiom about SU aims (they didn't question it, either); U-2; Corona/Keyhole; Penkovsky (August-April, 1961, 1962); SI; controversy among intell agencies (or negative evidence it was based on) nor footnotes in NIEs, which they didn't see!); unreliability of AFCIN estimates; Turkey radar (short and long-range missile tests)

What even the low (though not low enough) estimates indicated was the prospective loss of ability of US to deter "SU aggression." I.e., Type II could not be credible—i.e., FU—because of lowering of Type I. US FU against SU "aggression" could trigger a SU FS (see AJW, Delicate Balance); or else, SU might respond in kind, or esc, challenging US to move to FS (and perhaps be preempted, or suffer great damage. In other words, as Perle feared in 1980s, US president would be afraid to confront SU in TW or Europe (backed up by a US FU threat).

But RAND/AJW stressed "deterrent gap" (of I: though it also applied to Type II based on FU) not just because he wasn't relying on the high estimates of SU ICBMs, but because the pre-war balance was irrelevant (given soft vehicles in US, or both; vulnerability of US). Whether SU had "more" ICBMs, even much more, was not the issue. Even a smaller ICBM force than the US had (soft) would be a threat to survival of SAC. RAND looked at "only" 150 or 250 ICBMs: not at 30 (?) and certainly not 4=10.

(He and RAND paid no attention to thought that SU ICBMs would also be soft; and didn't know that SU bombers were soft, concentrated and non-alert, and surveilled by SI).

Our attitude was that SAC's estimates were undoubtedly high and even USAF's perhaps high, but we didn't even know Army-Navy; we thought Ike's calm was pathological or age, Symington's and Gaither's urgency was right.

But AWM knew Proctor and Scoville, and knew no gap: but he couldn't tell us why, and didn't.

RAND shared "the same assumptions about Russian intentions, the same judgment that the Soviets would very likely threaten to attack [or even attack] the US once they had, on paper, the technical ability to do so. "FK 172. [See K threats at Suez! And over Iraq/Kuwait! Though, total bluffs!)]BUT: would threats be prudent for K if THEY were vulnerable? Even if, or especially if, they had a FS capability? (Encouraging preemption). But RAND assumed (and HK) that we were easily deterred, but Soviets were not. (Contrary to York).

And (USAF) that they would work hard, perhaps crash (Rush and Horelick) to achieve

tht capability as soon as possible. (Thus, even “low end” estimates reflected that ideological assumption. And AFCIN regarded it as a “fact” that they were witnessing a very rapid buildup (for whatever purpose other than the AFCIN=assumed purposes of blackmail or attack, world domination, elimination of their major threat.

Dulles early (1948) believed that nucs would be used in war, and retaliatory power (against non-nuc aggression) was basic. (Yet, Jan, 1954: SU had tested a supposed “H” weapon, US an H device in 1952, about to drop Castle Bravo in March!

Meanwhile, the FS threat was better than it looked to minimum deterrence advocates (including USN): unless a small retaliation (or large against Europe!) was deterrent to US.

176: Ike worshipped free market, loathed taxation, debt and inflation, “national bankruptcy.” Sure that any direct clash between US and SU would involve full force nucs from outset (SIOP), and any TW clash as big as Korea would use nucs. But this was already USAF doctrine. Goldwater, 1964. (BOTH OF THESE WERE WHAT I DISCOVERED IN 1959-61.] Even USN agreed, 1951. JCS, 1951. 183 Dulles simply made this public. (Threat! And, siding with USAF and USN vs. Army on ground forces (Bradley, chairman in 1952); (Acheson and Nitze had sided with Army, need for ground forces: even to keep SU out of Europe, SAC alone couldn’t do it. (Then? A-bombs) Radford, 1954: “atomic forces are now our primary forces.” Fission and fusion will be (used. **“Victory will come to the side that makes best use of it.” (fissile material...) and that means, first use of it! 184**

To Nitze, Korea proved that reliance on atomic weapons alone would not deter Soviets. ((And see Indochina!) (Dulles saw nuc threats as having ended Korea: probably wrong, but he believed. And threats kept NVN from invading SVN.) (vs. massive retaliation): and US had atomic monopoly (not literally, in 1950, but virtually). And “bankruptcy” of US was crazy, economically.

(Different Wall St. economics than Dulles, Humphrey, Dodge, Ike!

e Also, SU ability to retaliate massive against US! (Nitze always against NFU but for more ground forces, too. Not FS attack, but FS threat, backing up FU; (puzzle: his weapons proposals in 1970s, vs. SU “superiority,” seem merely to meet US with “parity” of FS capability, not remove SU CF capability but to match it. (Which actually increases our FS **threat** while not increasing type I deterrence, in fact, reducing it. ✓

e **That’s my thesis: construction of instability, to maintain FS threat (behind FU threat) in period where both have strong second-strike forces, both “can” retaliate**

massively.

WWK: Brodie, WWK: "How to deter an enemy from aggression in an age when both sides would have plenty of atomic bombs?" 190

HAK! Knorr! TCS!

Brodie, Jan. 54, Foreign Affairs: (same date as Dulles): "National objectives cannot be consonant with national suicide...[given H]

there is no use talking about a mutual exchange of nuclear weapons as being anything other than national suicide." BUT: threat, risk! WWK: this means, no use of nucs (not controlled, limited, tactical). Brodie soon agreed: deterrence by conventional means.

Supports Army. Theory of limited war (anathema to USAF; but I admired it). Keep war from going nuclear. (But later: keep nuclear war, too, limited, controlled, calculable.) Give up "victory" ("overwhelmingly favorable") in both. Stalemate, in view of reserves on both sides.

But Air Force wins the contests. JSCP. 196

RAND game in 1956, Speier and Goldhamer: could NATO trust us to attack Russia?

RAND: "the US should supply the NATO allies with their own nuclear weapons. "!(Ike, too?) WWK appalled: (didn't want to proliferate; didn't want FU, by allies any more than US; yet he turns to...making US threat credible?) 202.

202 "From that point on, WWK felt that he had to find some way to maintain NATO's credibility without having to resort to spreading nuclear weapons all over the globe." {BUT was there a real threat to NATO? Also, the "worst (best) case estimates had led to the creation of a Domsday Machine! "and without committing suicide." (HK)

AJW also opposed to prolif: because such weapons, close to Soviets, would be vulnerable. (Submarines?)

[A given at RAND: SU was equipped with lots of nucs; had world domination aim; relatively reckless (less than Hitler, more than US); rational. And we want to keep them from expanding (their aim). (So we're their target). So, what do you do?

NO CITIES: invented by Brodie in 1951, before he went to RAND, for Vandenberg.

Protected reserve as bargaining lever. LSR. Coerce Russians to surrender. Agreement at RAND, with AWM, Victor Hunt 204-05. Hunt: but don't just avoid cities (total

withholding plus threat of LSR! My current bent.): Hit the long-range bomber force. (Away from cities? OK, but...)(this presses SU to "lose or use..." And, obscures LSR strategy.) Counterforce. 1952. First to propose targeting military forces, not U-I. Brodie, 1953, "Must we Shoot from the Hip," and Brodie, Hitch and Marshall, "The Next Ten Years." Coercive strategy. Late 1954, Jim Digby, Ed Barlow, CF (SU planes non-alert). **R-290 focused on ability to destroy SU cities [AJW critique of min det later totally hypocritical!]** 209. As R-290 got underway in 1954, Marshall and Loftus. (1950: EWP geared to Delta, cities. But LeMay-type planners thought "that airfields were inappropriate targets for bombing, "especially for A-bombs. But Loftus targets airfields, with 500kt bombs. More data (inc. SI) than SAC wanted anyone to know outside. Still, planners would change DGZs toward cities, as "bonus": their real objective. 212 WWII. Big bomb is for big targets. (Like Hiroshima: to show its power.)

Like USAF, RAND in mid-50s was not interested in CF, believing it impossible to know where targets were; Marshall learned from Loftus this was not true. SI! (**And AWM told me, about non-alert.** AWM would tell colleagues that data existed for CF, but not what it consisted of. (Including German WWII photos). In summer, 1957, AWM goes to Gaither Committee.

Dismayed to find Gaither assumed targets were all cities; no analysis of what to do with nucs if war broke out; no CF; no reserve. (Both possible: but C3! My emphasis: but infeasible, bureaucratically and physically.) 213 (Yet: "massive retaliation" in GW was NOT unrealistic! We were!)

Goldhamer (with AWM at Chicao) and Leites (also, later/) AWM studies CF, to "discredit population targeting as a reasonable strategy." (**me!** 0

April 30, 1959: The Deterrence and Strategy of total War, 1959-1961. TS (It's so much in my line; yet I don't remember reading it! Well, I hadn't yet come back to RAND from Harvard; I think I did have TS...I read R-290...) 214 200 ICBMs, a few hundred bombers, or both: sneak attack. R-290, plus CF and withholding, Brodie, Hunt, and Strategic Objectives Committee. (**NOTE: I had just delivered Art of Coercion! Jesus!**)

Game theory form: matrices. (What I studied in Cambridge with Goodwin, linear algebra! 0 An expected-utility analysis! Not really game theory, but decision theory (like my Crude Analysis). Hypothetical numbers, but numbers (unlike Brodie and Hunt). With "probabilities" attached both to results and to countermoves...(not ambiguity, as it should; but then, I never used that myself!)

Two alternative strategies (pop-targeting being worst: Gaither, R-290 (both vs. optimum mix, 1959-60? Which also has military targets: vs. Navy). Military targets with very high yield weapons, fallout as bonus (why? Deterrence? Answer to 2009?. Or with surviving

forces, some at military targets, but large reserve force.

Assumption "that the Kremlin thinks about the bomb in much the same way as the RAND Corporation." Max expected utility. 215

Still, RAND doubts that the US had the intell data to find and destroy SU military targets. Marshall and Goldhamer, discreet sentence: "We believe that the US has relatively good knowledge of the location of operational bases in the SU." Loftus had told Marshall: WWII, balloons, U-2, SI, spies and in near future, recon satellites. (first 1960) (BREACH, since AWM didn't have these clearances! So, he told me, in a breach!) Others don't know "what it's possible for us to know." (See surveillance, now). (and drone targeting, assass.) (detention, in future). "Marshall and Loftus were frustrated by the skepticism, but did little to quash it. The information was just too sensitive to spread around indiscriminately."

1959-60 Strategic Offensive Forces study for White (intellectual! Vs. his attack in 1962). Ed Oliver. But assumes CF infeasible for intell reasons. M&L can't tell him. They talk to WWK. (AHA! More breaches?) Yes! 217!

Allied nucs: suicidal, but more credible. (Vs. French premier...)

To WWK: CF is the answer to his problem above. "If we did not strike at Soviet cities [in response to an invasion of Europe: it might be a more credible deterrent, because] perhaps the Soviets would strike back at something other than American cities. [NAH] And if, therefore, American cities were not placed so much at risk in the act of defending Western Europe, then America's commitment to the NATO alliance could once more be credible, which was to Kaufmann the objective of preeminent importance." 218

✓ Here is Athens, Ann Arbor (vs. Force de Frappe) and vs. SIOP-62: i.e., my policy. But I thought of it as purely a better second-strike strategy (which rationalized not hitting cities, and keeping central authority surviving, so as to justify putting locks on weapons: Oliver and Digby and Carne). For WWK, it was for Type II deterrence, credible FS threat. ✓

My fault: C3 aspects of this infeasible (though it could still serve my own objectives). But also, I didn't rule out CF (opening the door to FS, and to "damage-limiting," maintaining the status quo of large forces, DMs (either FS or MAD).

Control and coercion (conceivably: not effective in VN; in Korea?) feasible in limited

conventional war. Not really in nuclear war. (TCS wrong on this, too) But WWK saw this ("perhaps" SU would follow suit, CF: BUT IN EUROPE? HA! DID WWK EVER CONSIDER THIS?) (LIMIT IT TO EUROPE? POSSIBLY: EUROPEANS SAW THIS, AND WERE FREAKED, NOT BELIEVING IT GAVE ENOUGH DETERRENCE.)

But pre-war (IF allies bought this, as something the US believed, anyway, and might be willing to carry out) it would serve alliance cohesion, rather than proliferation. 218n But WWK was wrong to think this would go over with the allies! (And he wasn't averse to the USAF using this to beat Polaris with, and go for war-fighting, larger forces! Even though he worked for McNamara.)

(However, in 1961, WWK? Or hsr and Kaysen thought of this strategy as something that might actually be carried out, over Berlin. I myself proposed using it to a) deter SU from expanding a non-nuc conflict (or threatening to do so) that would "compel" US to carry out a FU threat: which we might be willing to do, because this US strategy/capability would deter the SU from responding to or escalating US FU in kind. Thus, it would increase the credibility of both a US FU threat and a US FS threat backing it up.

Thus, although this wasn't why I proposed it in the first place in early 1961 (still believing that the SU had at least parity, if not an advantage), I was willing to use it as a threat (which is how K heard it in Ann Arbor—as he was trying to reduce the US superiority by missiles in Cuba).

WWK wanted "all counterforce," no cities. I wanted no cities; I should have gone for all withholding (Polaris! Just what WWK was trying to beat, for the Air Force). Brodie 222 horrified that a purely CF attack would still kill two million people (when you combined CF with no cities.) But to Kahn: "only" two million would die: two types of targeting all the more distinctive. Kahn's deliberate image: "The living portrait of the ultimate defense intellectual, cool and fearless, asking the questions everyone else ignored, thinking about the unthinkable." (The USAF and engineers were assuming tens, then hundreds of millions!) Economic rationality: alternatives, optimal, least bad..."Kahn's specialty was to express the RAND conventional wisdom in the most provocative and outrageous fashion imaginable." 222 Kahn paraphrases Brodie (preferred withdrawal before ejaculation): to SAC officers: "Gentlemen, you don't have a war plan, you have a wargasm." (Spasm war). 223

Kahn critique (AHA!) of massive retaliation: mock-sincerity, a Doomsday Machine. (For Type II—which was, after all, the purpose of SAC. Supposedly, SIOP wasn't this ultimate, killing everyone: except that it was! (And even without retaliation! DM: might as well locate in US—like Dr. Strangelove—and that's still true, with nuclear winter! (Garwin: mine your own cities, to respond to bomb alarm system. Or like HK, to various provocations.)

Options needed. Not-incredible FS capability (vs. SU invasion of Europe.). Tit for tat, Type III. [My comment on FK: key limit of his book is inadequate discussion of II, I (III?)

A reason SU wouldn't follow our strategy: C3 problem, same as JCS realistic objection.²²⁴: Nitze's 1980's SU attack (window of vulnerability: thanks to our ICBMs, his MIRVs, MT...)

Against SU Type II, our type I would not look credible. (Suicidal, if spelled out. But so would SU attack be! Suicidal does not mean totally incredible.)

Foreseeing a near-term SU FS cap (CD, ICBMs...) "the next crisis,...the Soviets do not have to back down because of fear of an attack by the US—but we may." WRONG: Berlin, Cuba, Quemoy. But as SU military and JCS believed, what if postures had been reversed? I say: it didn't rely on superiority in either case, or even parity. And superiority was no longer available to either side, contrary to Nitze and Reagan.

Kahn was not advocating preventive war or surprise attacks on the SU. But he was promoting FU of nuclear weapons in face of provocations (didn't he later espouse NFU?) backed up by threat OR POSSIBLE "RATIONAL" FS.

Purpose of CD was not to protect US citizens in SU first strike, but "to enable the US to take much firmer positions" in hot and cold wars. For type II and type III. (See Perle in 1983, for CF weapons and CD; and CPD inference as to SU aims in CF and CD). At risk of carrying out threats (not, preemptive surrender, bluffs), Need to have capability to evacuate, practiced two or three times a decade. (Assuming SU was going for this capability as he wrote). Wrong. Recommends as consultant to Gaither: \$200 billion program, over 15 years. Another \$5 billion to provide space in the nation's mine shafts. ²²⁵ Dr. S!

Deterring SU blackmail. (which was never a problem in CW!)

For Brodie and WWK (and me) "approached the business of FU and CF strikes uneasily, as acts of desperation among a terrible set of choices. Kahn, on the other hand, dived in eagerly." See comments on 227-228. Newman.

(The assumption that the SU was preparing to do other these things, or worse! (the USAF FS, SIOP) seemed to legitimize our playing the game, as if there were no less-bad choice. Just as analysts coming into the problem after 1964, when the SU WAS building up, or 80s, must have seen it as "the way things are, the world, our problem." (Whereas I saw both the illusion, and then the expose—from 1961 or 1962 to 1964. 1963? PTB!

American University! 1964: my crisis study; then, VN.

Kahn: "The one circumstance under which almost all Soviet experts agree the Russians might strike us is the one in which they feel they are anticipating a strike by us." 229. "Yet wasn't that just what Kahn was advocating with his business about Types II [NATO! US actual plans, and posture!] and III Deterrence—reating a defense "posture" that would allow the US President to threaten the Russians with a first-strike in the event of a crisis?"

YES! That's what Carter-Reagan did in 1979-83! With that near effect! Able Archer. Kahn was exposing—expositing, espousing—what NATO/US/USAF plans and policy actually were! (Without himself knowing it; and without their espousing CD, which to Kahn alone made it credible on the basis of "rationality"—assuming millions of US dead were "rationally preferable" to accepting various provocations (another obscenity of Kahn's, which NATO didn't make explicit: they just threatened and prepared (without CD or ABM) without drawing attention to actual consequences, or claiming to be "rational." (Rather, honor, commitment, treaty...) (non-rational)

And optimistic results (which HK may have believed?! On basis of "free market" assumptions.)

Kahn sought, --as RAND did desperately (and HAK)—"more reasonable forms of using (nuclear) violence." (That can be done, up to a point, with non-nuclear war: e.g., condemning strategic bombing! Defeating conventional armies...) The desperation comes from looking at WWI; then, the end of WWII (inserting A-bomb into strategic bombing strategy (not looking ahead to SU A-bomb or mutual H or ICBMs).

[McNamara in MAD did not reject NATO policy, FU, FS or CF, reduce threat to SU, or ICBMs, or MIRV, or even (explicitly) "prevailing" (postwar coercion); and the SIOP never reflected MAD declaratory policy (not the action policy—merely staved off "full first strike" action policy). But, I guess, he did retreat from no-cities options, or no decap! Back to "optimum mix", though plus reserves (for what? With no C3—though they always "sought" that; and with decap. Maybe no China.)]

The Real Enemy: the Navy. Polaris, in 1958 (I at RAND, summer). 234 Jan. 22, 1958, John Coyle for NAVWAG takes R-290 and Gaither and draws ("true") implications: vulnerability of USAF planes and missiles would demand an arms race in numbers, plus give incentive to "preventive-war adventurism" (and preemption). Yes! (Never, really, SU Type II—they didn't need it, given limits on their expansionism—but preemption, yes). Polaris: adequacy for deterrence alone (urban targets), not for "winning" "false goal" (likewise, damage-limiting; preemption; decap!)

Navy hypocrisy in 1958: 180 degree turn from its abhorrence of city busting in 1949-50 (vs. B-36) to Polaris. (Likewise, AJW shift when he supports CF, D-L, ABM, vs. the city-busting deterrence of R-290). 235

Minimum number. Vs. FU/FS strategy. (Also: could avoid nuc winter: no need to threaten a large number of cities.) This could do the USAF in: genuine logic. (But does it give “credible” LSR Type II deterrence for Europe: compared to the delusions of tac nucs or CF disarming attack or even coercive attack by US, as something the US might do, without ability to disarm and without use-or-lose loss of control of tac nucs or ICBMs? “Too stable.”! Naval Warfare Analysis Group. Burke: Jan. 1957. Mutual deterrence (MAD: mutual assured deterrence! Mcnamara should have said!)

236 Air Force ‘war plan involved destroying an ‘optimal mix’ of urban and military targets. The report of an April 1959 “Coordination conference” between SAC and Britain’s bomber command referred to city destruction as the “Primary Undertaking” and destruction of military targets as the “Alternative Undertaking.”

(Reverse of GEOP. NEWC-2009. Wheless points out to SAC that labeling city bombing as the primary Undertaking plays into the hands of the Army and Navy concept, favoring Polaris and eliminating SAC! [(So—when was this changed? This was May 1959: I’m not yet at RAND OR CINCPAC!)

SOF falling apart at RAND (as I’m about to return); opposes B-70. Augenstein proposes gigaton bomb (1000 MT): 20 of these would be enough to deter and defeat. (See K’s 58 MT in 1961). Feb. 1, 1960, WWK, on leave from RAND at Yale, tells Tanham that Polaris can’t do CF or D-L. White has WWK write letter: on Feb. 18 (I in CINCPAC): Polaris couldn’t defend Europe, as well as a protected, land-based system “which appeared capable of conducting a CF campaign.” “Minimum Deterrence” strategy favored by the Navy “would hardly be a winning one.: No-win. No type II.

(I was drawn, pursuing no-cities, into a fight with Navy/Polaris (which I liked!) Tanham brings WWK together with Noel Parrish, who is combatting Polaris. Parrish had written speeches for Vandenberg and Twining, both of whom had done tactical bombing in WWII, and were not wedded to LeMay’s city-busting. In 1950, P. had written speeches “that entertained the notion of using the bomb against military targets only.” (See Leghorn and...No Need to Bomb Cities...) WWK in June 1960 WW says his solution to the “Polaris Puzzle” was to alter SAC’s strategy to attacking military targets only. (vs. “optimum mix”—which was really a SAC concept, vs. Navy’s “cities-only.”)

LeMay opposed pure-CF. He told Parrish that “SAC studies showed that no matter what our targeting or Russian targeting might be, the number of people killed on both sides remained about the same.”. (YES! Especially with ground bursts, and large number of “military targets, including C3). Parrish sees WWK’s coercive strategy as the way to

convince SAC! Sends him back to RAND to work on CF study, comparing outcomes; McGarvey and Fank Trinkl. AJW: in war, strategy should be to “limit damage” to the US homeland. (EUROPE?) WWK had told AJW: “If you want to limit damage, don’t drop the bombs in the first place.” YES! 240

But WWK: point was not merely to limit damage, but to bargain the enemy into surrender, to attack military targets and avoid urban targets as a means of coercion. (My policy, though I didn’t aim at “surrender”—not first-strike!)

Both CF/WWK and my strategy encouraged an arms race—the CF part—which was NOT on already in reality (only in AFCIN estimates!) It encouraged the 1000 MM (whereas the Navy strategy would not have! Jesus!) WWK and RAND had only the AFCIN estimates—and were talking to the Air Force. And vs. “empty holes” (2nd strike D-L) “SU would have a reserve force” (and as AWM told me, many missiles would be delayed firing.)

Best hope in a desperate situation. (Which was not, in reality, desperate: though SAC approach would have been catastrophic if its own estimates had been right.

White embraced approach, though he had opposed it in June 1958, two years earlier: Polaris had emerged. (to do the SAC-traditional mission much better!) (LeMay’s mission!)

WWK’s CF becomes official USAF policy, and is LEAKED (to combat Navy). But not for SAC! (SIOP-62!) Power abhorred any departure from WWII strat bombing policy (firebombing!) 245. (I won him over, in 1961! “My” policy was USAF? White position; SIOP-62 was SAC’s.

December 12, 1960 [I in DC on Devolution of Presidential Authority study for Gates?!] WWK briefs Power in Omaha. Two minutes into lecture, “Power interrupted with a long tirade against everything that Kaufmann was saying.

“Why do you want us to restrain ourselves? Power bellowed. “Restraint! Why are you so concerned with saving their lives. The whole idea is to kill the bastards!|” After several minutes of this, he finally said, “Look. At the end of the war, if there are two Americans and one Russian, we win!”

Kaufmann snapped back: “Well, you’d better make sure that they’re a man and a woman.” At that point, Power stalked out of the room. The briefing was over. 246

Weeks later, White assured Power, who wanted to be sure that WWK did not represent Air Force position on strategy or targeting, that in Feb. 1960, briefing to Ike, “I endorsed the ‘optimum-mix- concept. Conditional endorsement of WWK briefing for options in

the future. [But either approach in 1961-62: "won" over SU (before global starvation) in Power sense; destroyed Europe (SU retal.); caused nuclear winter (with broad military targets, near cities).

(Trinkl and McGarvey in their CF FS attack limit targets to bomber fields, missile pads, sub pens and control centers associated with the Soviet SRF. (not Moscow?) Not rail centers, shipyards, factories; or cities). 3 million Americans die, 5 million Russians. (BUT: no tac nucs in Europe? And European dead?! NOT COUNTED).²⁴³

Save 100 million lives. The Frykund book 1962 is based on WWK briefing, leaked to him by Parrish. My first questioning by FBI.